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T
he retail payments system in the United States has changed 
significantly in recent years. Advances in technology have
caused a greater reliance on electronic payment networks. And
the industrial structure of the payment services industry has evolved, as
more and more nonbanks deliver payment products to end users and
supply back-end processing. In general, these changes have made the
payments system more efficient and given more choices to consumers
and more payment options to merchants and businesses. 
At the same time, however, the rapid pace of change has introduced
new risks to the payments system. For example, data breaches appear to be
on the rise. Since 2005, 34 states have implemented new laws requiring
nonbanks to disclose data breaches.
1 In January 2007, the retailer TJX
Companies, Inc., announced that hackers had gained unauthorized access
to 45.7 million payment card numbers—the largest data breach in U.S.
history (Abelson). 
Such recent changes have potentially introduced more risk to the
payments system for three reasons. First, as more and more banks market
payment services to nonbanks and outsource payments processing, the
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differences in information possessed by payments participants can
magnify difficulties in managing risk. Second, electronic payments have a
significantly different risk profile than paper checks. Third, greater com-
plexity of the payments network potentially reduces incentives to manage
risk and may cause difficulties in coordinating risk mitigation. 
This article lays the groundwork for a dialogue on policy to control
risk in the U.S. retail payments system. The first and second sections
give an overview of the shift toward nonbank payments providers and
electronic payments and how the shift may expose retail payments to
more risk. The third and fourth sections review the current supervisory
structure over nonbank payments providers and risk management in the
retail payments system. The fifth section discusses some of the options
policymakers have that could strengthen the management of retail pay-
ments risk. 
The article shows that while there are new or magnified risks, a sub-
stantial amount of private and public effort is directed at controlling risk
in retail payments. Risk management by the payments industry is effec-
tive, but there are inherent difficulties in market mechanisms that
control risk. These difficulties suggest some public involvement is
needed to attain a socially desirable level of risk management in retail
payments. Both private and public efforts at risk management could be
made more effective by some policy adjustments. 
The article concludes that a thorough review of supervisory author-
ity relevant to retail payments would be valuable. In particular, the
original authority to supervise nonbank payment processors was estab-
lished over 40 years ago, when the primary reason for establishing that
authority was the use of computer technology applied to bank account-
ing systems. Is that authority adequate given the revolutionary changes
in the payments technology seen over the last four decades? 
I.  THE GROWING PRESENCE OF NONBANKS IN THE
U.S. PAYMENTS SYSTEM
At the end of World War II, retail payments were made either by
cash or checks. Since then many new options have been added, includ-
ing credit cards, automated clearinghouse (ACH) payments, ATM
machines, online debit cards, offline debit cards, stored value cards, and
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online payments. These new choices have given nonbanks opportunities
to service the payments process, and nonbanks have often innovated
new payment options. 
Nonbanks have become increasingly pervasive in both the front-end
and in back-end processing of payments (Bradford, Davies, and Weiner
2003). While banks dominate in a number of areas (check processing,
clearinghouses, credit card networks, ATMs, issuing of debit and credit
cards), most payments activity has some nonbank presence. Nonbanks
control virtually the entire market for check authorization and lead in
online user authentication. Nonbanks are major suppliers of bank
accounting systems and Internet banking software. Nonbanks have a
large presence in provision of early-stage payments infrastructure (hard-
ware, software, data processing of accounting systems) and dominate the
hardware category. They originate roughly half of ACH payroll deposits.
They dominate ACH outsourcing, card-issuer processing, business-to-
business information exchange services, Web hosting, electronic bill
presentment and payment services, person-to-person payments, retail
wire services, money orders, and check cashing services. 
Data revealing nonbank trends are scarce, but good data are avail-
able on regional ATM networks. Chart 1 shows the ownership
information on the top 20 regional ATM networks from 1985 to 2006.
Networks are classified as being owned either by nonbanks, single
depository institutions, or joint ventures of two or more depository
institutions. In 1990, nonbanks owned only two of the top 20 ATM
networks. Moreover, as shown in Chart 2, the share of network transac-
tions processed by these two ATM networks was small.
2 Starting in the
1990s control of transactions flowing through ATM networks shifted
substantially toward nonbank-owned networks. In 1995 their control
was minimal, but today nonbank-owned networks process nearly 60
percent of ATM transactions. The dramatic change is one reason that
bankers and policymakers have begun to closely monitor changes in the
structure of the payments processing industry.
Another reason that nonbank payment providers have drawn atten-
tion is the visible innovation they have brought to the market. The
nonbank organizations CheckFree, Yodlee, Tempo, and PayPal have
been major contributors to developments in areas such as electronic bill
presentment and payment (EBPP), retailer issued debit cards, and
online payments. 
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Chart 2
SHARE OF ATM TRANSACTION VOLUME BY
OWNERSHIP OF ATM NETWORK
Notes: The break at 2002-2003 is due to different methods of calculating transaction volume.
Prior to 2003, many ATM transactions were counted by more than one ATM network. As a
result, measures of aggregate market share could be above 100 percent. Much of the double
counting was eliminated for 2003 to 2005.
Source: EFT Network Data Book (various years)
Chart 1
OWNERSHIP OF TOP 20 REGIONAL ATM NETWORKS
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While most EBPP is currently done directly on biller websites,
growth of EBPP at consolidator sites has been estimated to be twice that
of biller sites.
3 CheckFree Corporation is the dominant provider of this
service (Wolfe 2006, 2004).
4 Yodlee offers bill consolidation services on
behalf of an extensive number of billers and has partnered with America
Online to offer EBPP (Ramsaran). 
Another recent innovation is the retailer-issued debit card. Tempo
Payments, Inc., provides origination and network processing services that
facilitate retailer issuance of debit cards. Transactions processed through
Tempo are less costly to retailer issuers, in part, because the transaction
goes through the ACH network rather than the electronic funds transfer
(EFT) network. 
Arguably the most visible nonbank that has made major payment
innovations in recent years is PayPal, the payments subsidiary of eBay.
PayPal dominates the business of person-to-person online payments and
has pioneered the provision of payment services to small online retailers.
Founded in 1998, it now has 133 million account holders worldwide.
During fourth quarter 2006, the value of PayPal’s total transaction
volume was $11 billion, up 36 percent from fourth quarter 2005.
5
PayPal continues to develop its services and has launched initiatives to
offer credit to accountholders and to extend its payment services to
retailers beyond the online auction market.
6
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR RISK IN THE RETAIL
PAYMENTS SYSTEM
Nonbanks participating in the payments system and new payment
technology can introduce new risks or magnify existing risks in pay-
ments.
7 Nonbank participation disperses control of payment access
beyond the banking system and exposes financial institutions to more
outsourcing risk (Table 1). At the same time, economies of scale in
payment services leads to market evolution that can concentrate risk in
a few payments participants. Moreover, the network architecture of pay-
ments can lead to coordination difficulties and inadequate incentives to
manage risk. While examples can illustrate these problems, empirical
analysis would be valuable to inform policy on managing payments risk. 
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Operational risk in payments can take many forms, such as fraud,
exposure of sensitive data, operational breakdowns, single points of
failure, and complicated coordination of risk management. The disrup-
tions resulting from these risks are not at the level of systemic risk, where
one participant in a settlement process fails to meet its obligations,
causing other participants to fail to meet their obligations. But these
operational risks can have widespread consequences, and they can be
very costly due to the direct consequences of correcting the problem, the
opportunity costs of lost economic activity, and the loss of public confi-
dence in established and emerging payments. The Bank of England has
called this type of risk systemwide risk and has identified it as a major
concern in its oversight of the British payments system (Bank of
England). While systemwide risk would not be associated with financial
market instability, changes in the payments system suggests that large-
scale disruptions are more likely than in the past. 
Nonbanks and payments
Banks and nonbank payment providers are gatekeepers for the pay-
ments system and as such help control payments risk. One difficulty we
face today is that access control may be more of a challenge. Established
methods of screening and monitoring can prove to be inadequate given
the development of new payment types and emergence of new types of
Table 1
PAYMENT RISK AND NONBANKS
Source of Risk Novel Features Potential Difficulty
Nonbanks in payments •  Access control • Fraudulent use of payments
•  Outsourcing and marketing  • Inadequate data security
payment services • Single point of failure
• Concentration • Operational breakdown
Electronic and network • Electronic forms of payment • Electronic modes of 
technology • Open architecture payment fraud
• Large-scale processing • Easy access
• Network systems and  • Widespread disruptions
rapid development • Cascading failures
• Complex risk management
Interactions of nonbanks • Simultaneous risk exposure • Coordination challenges
and technology • Conflicts of interest • Inadequate incentives to 
manage risk
• Secrecy
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business (such as online retailing). Moreover, this gatekeeping function
may be more important than in the past because the stakes are higher.
Computer technology can be exploited in a manner that is fast, can be
scaled to large values, and can be difficult to detect or trace. 
On the simplest level, nonbanks pose risk because they offer alterna-
tive points of access for criminals into the payments system. For
example, in 2000, two criminals gained unauthorized access to an Inter-
net service provider in the United States and misappropriated credit
card, bank account, and other personal financial information of more
than 50,000 individuals. They then hijacked computer networks and
used the compromised processors to commit fraud through PayPal and
the online auction company eBay (U.S. Department of Justice).
8
More broadly, banks provide nonbanks with access to the payments
system either by outsourcing payment processing or by selling payment
services. In recent years, the risk associated with such access appears to
be more widespread (Breitkopf 2004). In 2005, for example, improper
security and record retention practices allowed a data breach at the
nonbank credit card processor CardSystems Solutions, Inc., which
exposed 40 million cardholder account numbers. An incomplete audit
prevented the bank that outsourced card processing to CardSystems
from either requiring compliance with appropriate practices or working
with an alternative compliant processor (Fest). As a second example, in
2005, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) banned the Assail Telemar-
keting Network after it had defrauded hundreds of thousands of
customers (FTC). Though not directly involved in the scheme, the bank
that sold ACH services to the company agreed to perform appropriate
screening of potential ACH clients in the future to help prevent this
type of criminal activity (Iowa Attorney General). 
Nonbank presence in payments also has implications on a system
level. Economies of scale have concentrated key payment services in a few
processors. In the United States today, the top three networks process
nearly 80 percent of PIN debit transactions (Hayashi, Sullivan, and
Weiner). Two of these networks are nonbanks and the third will become a
nonbank in the near future.
9 These key payment services now represent
potential single points of failure that, if failure does occur, could cause
widespread operational breakdowns. Moreover, nonbanks do not have the
cushion supplied by the federal safety net. Thus, a significant breakdown
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or failure caused by a nonbank payment provider has greater potential for
serious consequences than a failure caused by a bank-affiliated payment
provider (Hoenig). 
Electronic and network technology
Electronic payments—debit cards, credit cards, and ACH transac-
tions—have grown rapidly. Now more than half of noncash retail
payments are initiated electronically (Gerdes and Walton 2002, 2005).
This trend will accelerate as new methods of using electronic payments
are created. While electronic payments offer significant efficiency gains,
they also pose a new set of risks compared to those in a paper-check
based system because they depend on substantially different technology. 
To provide perspective on these risks, it is useful to first review risks
associated with checks. Check-based payments have customarily been
closed systems. Whether processing is done internally at banks or out-
sourced, the closed system simplifies control of operational risk because
access is limited to those who have paper checks (Lemieux; Office of Tech-
nology Assessment). Risk in check processing has largely been confined to
returns of individual checks due to insufficient funds or to fraudulent
checks (GAO). The potential for operational errors in check processing
that would aggregate into large scale disruption is limited because checks
require physical handling of individual items. Check clearing systems
aggregate to large dollar values at the point of settlement, which is also the
point of greatest potential for large-scale disruptions. Control of this risk is
simplified by allowing only well-defined, approved parties access to Federal
Reserve settlement accounts. Overall, years of experience have led to risks
in check-based payments systems that are either well controlled or that
pose limited widespread consequences.
10
Electronic payment processing presents some challenges for risk
control that are different from paper-based systems. Online debit trans-
actions, for example, are processed in real time so that it may be
impossible to reverse a fraudulent transaction. Moreover, conducting
electronic payment fraud does not require a paper check—merely access
to a computer and a few bits of information related to a credit card or
bank account. One result is that eBay and its payment subsidiary PayPal
are top targets of phishers attempting to get victims to reveal credit card
or bank information using misrepresented e-mails.
11 
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Open architecture typical of today’s computer networks increases
the risk of unauthorized access, and the scale of a successful hack of a
payment database can be enormous. The TJX data breach, for example,
was the result of a successful external attack on its computer system
(Abelson). While experience has shown that only a small fraction of
compromised records are exploited, large-scale data breaches can still
cause widespread consequences. This data breach also highlights the role
of  retailers, a nonbank element of the payments system that is often
excluded from discussions of payments system risk. 
Operational disruptions in electronic payments can affect many end
users. ACH systems process payments in batches that contain large
numbers of transactions, which could cause wide disruptions if processing
errors occur. A good example is the 2004 software glitch that caused a
two-day crash of the U.S. Central Credit Union’s network for handling
ACH transactions. The disruption delayed thousands of transactions for
up to four days (Wade).
12 Nonbanks are also exposed to this type of oper-
ational risk. In October 2004, a site redesign crippled some of PayPal’s
operations, leaving the website unavailable for two days, with intermittent
outages for several days thereafter (Wagner). In June 2005, a power outage
disrupted CheckFree’s EBPP service (CheckFree). 
Data security breaches can have similar cascading effects. Data
breaches such as those at CardSystems Solutions and TJX have led banks
to reissue payments cards. Banks often bear the direct cost of any fraud at
points-of-sale or ATMs resulting from data breaches, but consumers can
also spend considerable time and expense in protecting their assets and
recovering their credit standing. Online merchants, who forgo payment
guaranties by accepting card-not-present transactions, must pay the cost
when fraudulent transactions are charged back to their accounts. 
The network architecture and rapid development of electronic pay-
ments provide additional challenges (Bank of England; McPhail). Rapid
development of electronic payments technology complicates risk control
because new sets of hard-to-determine threats arise with each generation
of technology (Kimball). The history of vulnerabilities offers less infor-
mation, so effective risk control methods need to be more forward
looking (McPhail). Payment technology is often complex, requiring
banks, nonbank payments providers, and bank regulatory agencies to
have sufficient internal expertise to understand, analyze, or implement
an effective risk control environment.
13
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Interactions of nonbanks and technology
The trend toward electronic payments can exacerbate the risks
posed by nonbank presence in the payments system. Compared to
paper-based payments, risk control in electronic payment networks
requires a high degree of simultaneous coordination among all partici-
pants. While both banks and nonbanks must cooperate, a wider
variation in the types of organizations in the network complicates
design, execution, and enforcement of security standards. 
In addition, the interaction among participants in electronic
payment networks generates conflicts of interest that make control of
risk difficult. For example, dependence on electronic communications
introduces a new set of vendors into payments processing that supply
security as well as many interlinking services (website hosting, ISPs, and
telecommunications companies). Security incidents at these providers
reflect poorly on their services, and they have an incentive to limit the
spread of news about any incident. But effective risk control of the pay-
ments system requires good information about security breaches, both
to warn other participants about specific problems and to design effec-
tive mechanisms to control risk. This conflict of interest has motivated
recommendations for regulatory mandates for the reporting of security
breaches and operational disruptions (Glaessner, Kellerman, and
McNevin 2002). 
An analysis of recent data breaches
Anecdotal examples are useful for understanding how nonbanks have
magnified payments risk. But empirical analysis of data security incidents
and operational breakdowns would be particularly helpful to inform deci-
sions about risk management policy for the retail payments system. Table
2 shows an analysis of data breaches that have occurred in the United
States from January 2005 to April 2007. The record of incidents was
assembled by the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, which relies on public
information sources. They list breaches where information exposed would
be useful for identity theft, which often manifests itself in fraudulent use
of some type of payment. The information is sufficient to roughly identify
the sectors of the economy where the data were compromised. 
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During this 28-month period, 541 data breaches were publicly
reported. Most of the breaches—402—occurred in the second half of
the period (after April 1, 2006). We cannot conclude with certainty that
the number of data breaches actually increased because numerous new
laws on notification were implemented after the middle of 2005, at least
partially causing a rise in publicly-disclosed data breaches. 
Still, the publicly-disclosed data breaches can be interpreted as
revealing one of two undesirable aspects of retail payments risk. Either
the 139 incidents reported in the first half of the period significantly
understate actual data breaches, or the number of breaches increased
rapidly in the second half. 
Data breaches compromised nearly 154 million records. Roughly
three-quarters of the records were compromised in just three incidents:
the large data breaches at TJX and CardSystems, and a data breach
reported in May 2006 at the U.S. Department of Veteran’s Affairs that
compromised 28.6 million records. These three incidents compromised
a total of 116 million records. Like many measures of risk, very few inci-
dents can account for a large portion of losses. 
Occurrences of data breaches and compromised records do not nec-
essarily go hand in hand. The nonbank payment processor sector
accounted for only 3.0 percent of all data breaches but 26.5 percent of
compromised records. This sector was responsible for nearly 75 percent
of compromised records in the first half of the period. On this data, a
reevaluation of public policy towards risk management for nonbank
payment processors may be valuable.
14
The bank and financial services sector accounted for 9.4 percent of
incidents and 4.1 percent of records compromised over the entire
period. The worst blemish for bank and financial services was the 10.7
percent share of records compromised in the first half of the period.
However, the share fell to only 0.6 percent in the second half. 
This record may not reflect the true underlying risk associated
across the sectors. Federal and state disclosure guidelines are not
uniform. If disclosure standards were not equal, then data across sectors
or states may not be comparable. In addition, records across sectors may
not be equally useful for misuse. Data from the bank and financial serv-
ices or the nonbank payments processing sectors may be particularly
useful in perpetrating payments fraud compared to that of other sectors. 
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While data breaches in Table 2 suggest an upward trend, the uncer-
tainty of that conclusion illustrates the shortage of good data on
payments risk. Information that reflects the outcomes of data breaches
suggests that consequences may be limited and trending downward.
One analysis calculated the likelihood that exposed identity information
is misused at less than one in 1,000 (ID Analytics). Survey data suggest
that, from 2003 to 2006, the number of adult victims of identity fraud
fell 12 percent (although the average fraud loss per case increased 22
percent) (Javelin Research). Some analysts have argued that fraud relat-
ing to these breaches is rare and that most of the cost related to identity
theft is borne by businesses (Lindenmayer; Lenard and Rubin). On the
other hand, a recent rise in debit transactions charged back to consumer
accounts has been attributed to data breaches and at least one report
documents a recent rise in measures of internet security threats (Bre-
itkopf 2006a).
15
In short, nonbank payments participants and electronic payments
introduce new risks into the payments system, some of which com-
pound one another. Threats and disruptions to payments are becoming
commonplace, and while disruptions thus far have not risen to the level
of a systemic problem, numerous disruptions qualify as systemwide dis-
turbances. Data that measure payments risk are limited and must be
interpreted carefully, but can be useful to inform policy decisions. 
III.  REGULATION OF NONBANK 
PAYMENT PROVIDERS
Public interest in the payments systems has the goal of ensuring
safety, efficiency, and access. To achieve this goal, public authorities in
the United States consider competition, consumer protection, data secu-
rity, prudential supervision, and law enforcement.
16 Table 3 describes
these areas of concern, their legal basis, and other details of regulation
and enforcement. The extent and complexity of public involvement
vary across elements of the payments process (from initiation to final
settlement), institutional aspects of the payments industry, and the legal
issues tied to payments. 
The last column of Table 3 shows areas where banks and nonbank
organizations are treated equally or unequally. Only in the areas of data
security and prudential supervision is treatment unequal, which is
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largely a result of enabling legislation that applies regulation specifically
to financial institutions. This section describes nonbank regulation in
the areas of data security and of prudential supervision. 
One determinant of the authority to supervise payment providers in
the United States is the provider’s relationship with a bank. Some
payment providers are affiliated with banks, either as subsidiaries or as
separate entities in a bank holding company. Some of the largest pay-
ments processing operations in the United States are affiliated with
banking organizations such as Fifth Third Bancorp, U.S. Bancorp, and
JPMorgan Chase. Many organizations that provide or process payments
in the United States have no affiliation with a banking company.
Among the larger organizations without affiliation are First Data Corpo-
ration, MasterCard, and PayPal. 
If a payment provider is affiliated, then federal bank supervisors have
authority to examine its activities. If a payment provider is not affiliated,
then it may or may not be subject to federal supervision depending on
whether it has an outsourcing relationship with a bank (Sullivan).
17
Data security
Federally mandated standards and enforcement for security of pay-
ments data can be different for bank and nonbank organizations. The
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 set data security requirements for
financial institutions and therefore applies to payments data. If a bank
outsources payment processing to a nonbank, then the nonbank is
subject to the same data security standards as banks. Otherwise, there is
no similar federal data security requirement for nonfinancial institutions.
To some extent, the FTC has filled this gap by enforcing data security
standards for retailers and other organizations. The FTC views breaches
of payments data security as an unfair and deceptive business activity. In
cases of breaches of payments data, it has reached settlements with firms
as diverse as retailers, payment processors, and software developers.
18
Prudential supervision of nonbank payment providers
Supervision of nonbank payment providers is part of a broader
program of supervising technology service providers. The primary focus
of this supervision is to protect the provider’s bank clients, with a 
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secondary benefit of protecting the payments system. Supervisory agen-
cies use a risk-based approach that helps ensure that those nonbank
payments processors posing the greatest risk are subject to more strin-
gent supervision. But an unknown number of payments processors are
not under any supervision. And in cases where inadequate control of
risk require enforcement, the enforcement options for nonbanks are
weaker compared to those available to bank supervision. 
The main purpose of prudential supervision is to ensure financial
health and safe operation of an organization. Banks, for example, are
regulated and examined, and the historic goal of supervision is to
protect depositors by ensuring banks operate in a safe and sound
manner. Payments activity is within the scope of examination, which
may help manage payment risk, but control of risk in the nation’s pay-
ments system is a secondary benefit. 
Supervision of nonbank payments processors is the responsibility of
the same agencies that supervise financial institutions. Authority comes
from the 1962 Bank Service Company Act. At that time, computer
automation of crucial bank accounting systems and payments process-
ing was growing important. The primary purpose of the act was to
provide legislative authority allowing banks to invest in computer
service companies. Section 5 of the act confirmed the supervisory
authority of federal agencies over bank-owned computer service compa-
nies. More important, it made explicit that this authority extended to
nonbank-owned servicers.
19
Today, these service companies are called Technology Service
Providers (TSPs). Supervision of TSPs uses resources of federal supervi-
sory agencies but is coordinated by the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC).
20 A risk-based approach used by these
agencies determines the activities covered under the supervision
program, the process used to select entities for supervision, and the fre-
quency of monitoring and examination. The FFIEC oversees
development of examination guidelines and establishment of uniform
rating systems for providers of information system services to banks. It
also establishes policy regarding agency responsibility, which TSPs get
examined, the frequency of examination, and the scope of supervision. 
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Early examination of TSPs covered hardware and software associ-
ated with general ledger accounting, transaction recording, and check
processing, such as transport, capture, and reconciliation. TSP exams
subsequently expanded to match changes in technology employed by
banks and now include information systems, electronic payments, tele-
phone banking, and Internet banking. 
Supervision of TSPs is administered either nationally or regionally
(FFIEC 2003b). Those that are nationally administered are in the
Multi-Regional Data Processing Servicer (MDPS) program. An organi-
zation is considered for the MDPS program when it provides core
information system applications for a large number of depository insti-
tutions or if it works from a number of data centers located in different
geographic regions. TSPs included in the MDPS program are consid-
ered to pose systemic risk. Supervised TSPs that service depository
institutions from more than one charter class, but are not included in
the MDPS program, are administered regionally. 
The FFIEC uses a risk-based approach for TSP supervision and
examination. The goal of the approach is to aim examination resources
at areas of “highest potential risk to...[a TSP’s] serviced financial institu-
tions”(FFIEC 2003a). A TSP risk evaluation determines the time frame
for examination and monitoring activity and helps identify TSPs that
would come under the MDPS program (FFIEC 2003b). 
At year-end 2004, 125 TSPs were supervised (Table 4). Both
nonbank and bank TSPs are in the program, but twice as many
nonbank TSPs are supervised. Core processing (computer processing of
general ledger accounting and of information systems), offered by 68 of
the supervised TSPs, is the single most important line of business.
21
Compared to nonbank TSPs, core processing is more likely to be offered
by bank-affiliated TSPs. Core processing is offered by 73.8 percent of
bank-affiliated TSPs but by only 44.6 percent of nonbank TSPs. While
core processing is the most common activity, payments are also a focus
of supervised TSPs.
22 Nearly 70 percent of supervised TSPs offer at least
one type of payment processing service. 
The national supervision program tends to focus on payments-
related lines of business and on nonbank TSPs. Among the TSPs in the
national program, 69 percent are nonbank and 81 percent offer at least
one payment processing service. This correspondence could reflect the
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economics underlying payments processing which may lend itself to a
large-scale operation and a nonbank form of organization. Regardless of
the reason for the correspondence, it is likely that the resources brought
to supervision in the national program are more extensive than in the
regional supervision program, commensurate with the greater risk of the
payment processors in the national program. 
While the largest nonbank payments providers are probably repre-
sented in the TSP supervision program, it does not cover all TSPs that
offer payments services. For example, after a 2005 security breach at a
payments processor, news stories reported the existence of roughly 500
companies that process credit card payments (Dash).
23 But, at most, 87
payments processors were supervised at year-end 2004 (Table 4). 
One reason that many nonbank payments providers are not super-
vised is that the Bank Service Company Act is sufficiently narrow to
exclude many significant payment providers. In particular, nonbank
TSPs must be in an outsourcing relationship with a bank to be eligible
Table 4
BUSINESS LINES OFFERED BY SUPERVISED
TECHNOLOGY SERVICE PROVIDERS
Bank affiliation status Supervision program
All TSPs Nonbank Bank Affiliated National Regional
Business line No.  Percent No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent
Core processing 68 54.6 37 44.6 31 73.8 7 43.8 61 56.0
Any payments-related 
business line* 87 69.6 55 66.3 32 76.2 13 81.3 74 67.9
Other business 
line** 21 16.8 19 22.9 2 4.8 2 12.5 19 17.4
Total number of TSPs 125 83 42 16 109
*ACH processing/services, ATM processing/services/network/switch, bill payment service, credit card issuance,
credit and/or debit card merchant processing, credit card network/switch, check processing, check processing soft-
ware vendor clearing and settlement, POS processing/services/network/switch, and wholesale payments.
**Retail e-banking/transactional website hosting, electronic record safekeeping, imaging, loan or mortgage process-
ing/servicing, corporate e-banking/cash management, website hosting (informational), disaster recovery, investment
processing,  aggregation, asset/liability management, credit scoring, other emerging technologies, employee benefit
account processing, asset management processing, bank image processor, debit card “services,” Internet services, IRA
“services,” payroll “services,” safe deposit, student loan processor, trust processing services, Visa “services.”
Notes: Many TSPs are double counted because they offer core processing, payments, and/or other business lines. As
a result, the sum of the number of TSPs in each category is greater than the total number of TSPs, and the sum of
percentages is greater than 100 percent. TSPs in the national supervision program are in the MDPS examination
program. Other supervised TSPs are in the regional program. Bank affiliation status is determined by a significant
ownership position by one or more depository institution, whether run as corporations, limited partnerships, or
limited liability companies. A nonbank TSP has no significant ownership by a depository institution.
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for supervision. But many payment providers are customers of banks.
For example, PayPal or Ceridian Corp. originate many payments and
pass that information to banks for further processing.
24 In this instance,
the originator is purchasing payment services from the bank. A similar
relationship exists between banks and acquirers of point-of-sale transac-
tions or originators of many automated clearinghouse transactions. As
such, risk management via direct supervision is currently not an option
for these elements of the payments network. 
It is important to emphasize that the purpose of TSP supervision is
not the survival of the TSP or the viability of its business model (Federal
Reserve Board 2000). Rather, the TSP supervision program is targeted
as a service to the supervisors of depository institutions. It is useful
because examiners of depository institutions have a resource that they
can draw upon to understand the risks that an outsourcing relationship
might pose for the depository institution. The focal point is the risk to
serviced depository institutions. Ultimately TSP examination seeks to
ensure that there is a control environment that adequately addresses
these risks. 
Finally, supervisory agencies can examine nonbank payment
providers but have limited enforcement power if they find weaknesses at
the organization. Enforcement powers over financial institutions include
voluntary agreements, cease and desist orders, removal or prohibition of
individuals from an institution or the industry, civil money penalties,
termination of deposit insurance, appointment of bank conservators,
and divestment of activities (Spong). Enforcement powers over nonbank
payment providers include only voluntary agreements and prohibitions
on financial institutions from doing business with the service provider. 
IV.  MANAGEMENT OF RISK IN RETAIL PAYMENTS
Management of risk in retail payments in the United States involves
a mix of private and public activity. Market mechanisms and self-inter-
est lead the payment industry to continuously engage in this type of
activity. Public intervention in the U.S. retail payments market has been
relatively limited because market forces have generally been effective in
managing risk.
25 But limitations inherent in market driven management
of risk implies that public regulation and oversight also has value. 
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Industry efforts at risk containment
Traditional market mechanisms, such as insurance and pricing, are
important to industry efforts to managing risk in payments. In an
attempt to align pricing with responsibility for errors, the National
Automated Clearing House Association (NACHA) has proposed return
entry fees on ACH originators who initiate unauthorized payments
(Digital Transactions). Credit card issuers insure merchants against
payment fraud if they follow proper procedures when accepting some
payment cards. Insurance can be particularly effective if it reallocates
risks to those that can better control the risk. Payment card networks
can offer payment guarantees at a reasonable price because a centralized
method of detecting fraud is more efficient than having millions of mer-
chants install their own fraud detection systems.
But there are inherent difficulties in pricing and insurance.
26 Appro-
priate pricing of risk can be impossible without adequate information,
and insurance can induce risky behavior. Payment card holders, for
example, may not be sufficiently careful because they often do not face
any cost if they lose their card and it is used fraudulently. These difficul-
ties have led the payments industry to embrace containment as an
approach to risk management. Containment includes such activities as
setting standards for data security and operational risk, monitoring for
trends in risk and for compliance, and penalizing payment participants
for noncompliance. The ultimate penalty is exclusion from the pay-
ments system. 
Containment can be most effective at a network level, where risk
management can be comprehensive to include all participants and where
there is some control over membership in the network. Credit card net-
works have developed the Payment Card Industry (PCI) data security
standard, which began a phased implementation in 2005. It sets 12
requirements involving topics such as data encryption, intrusion detec-
tion, activity monitoring, and access controls. The standards apply to all
card network members, merchants that accept credit cards, and credit
card payments processors. Similarly, the NACHA recently created a Risk
Management Advisory Group to help implement a new risk manage-
ment framework (NACHA).
27 Subsidiary work groups are addressing
three areas of risk management: control of access to the ACH system, the
monitoring and control environment, and enforcement activity. 
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The payments industry has also established mechanisms designed to
foster cooperation across the industry in developing techniques to
manage risk and to share information that can assist in fighting fraud.
For example, the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis
Center (FS-ISAC) was established by the financial services industry in
1999.
28 This private sector initiative allows members to share informa-
tion about security incidents that represent threats to the U.S. financial
infrastructure. By allowing confidential reports of security incidents, FS-
ISAC can overcome the reluctance of firms to release information that
can damage a firm’s reputation. As a result, FS-ISAC can build a large
database of security events, which FS-ISAC can analyze to determine
vulnerabilities and develop responses to threats in a timely manner
(Cards International).
29
Another private industry effort addresses one shortcoming of risk
management at a network level. Historically, each payment channel—
checks, ACH, EFT networks, and credit card networks—has developed
separate standards and approaches to reducing risk. The Partner Group
is an private organization sponsored by the financial industry whose goal
is to foster cooperation among payment channels and address emerging
risks that may cross payment applications.
30 To accomplish its goal, The
Partner Group has established three working groups with representatives
from each payment channel to address sharing of fraud information, lia-
bility assignment among networks, and access of third parties to the
payments system. 
Risk management by public authorities
Despite diligent efforts, market imperfections such as the presence
of externalities can limit effectiveness of industry risk management.
31
Payments participants will manage risk in relation to the private cost
and benefit of their effort. But this effort also benefits other payment
participants because of the interdependency of risk management in a
network environment. This type of externality implies that the sum of
the risk management efforts of payments participants may be less than
socially desirable. Public involvement may also result in some efficiency
gains. For example, small banks have limited ability to monitor their
TSP providers, leading some to suggest that there would be value in a
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central bank role in developing standards and infrastructure (Lemieux).
Most important, trust in the payments system is a public good that war-
rants attention by public authorities.
As a result, there is a role for public involvement of managing risk in
the payments system. Some of these efforts involve setting risk control
standards as well as monitoring and enforcing their implementation. In
this regard, public authorities are involved in risk containment activities
that are similar to industry efforts. 
The public sector manages payments risk in a number of ways,
most directly by examining the payment activities of banks and super-
vised TSPs. This can help the financial industry improve data security
and enhance resiliency and operational integrity of the payments
system. Partly because of limited jurisdiction, other public authorities
(such as the FTC and law enforcement) have taken the lead in address-
ing payments data security outside of the financial industry. 
The Federal Reserve System has a number of programs that directly
or indirectly manages payments system risk. The Federal Reserve has
responsibility to oversee the payments system by monitoring payments
systems, assessing them for safety and efficiency, and inducing change
when necessary (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
2005). The Federal Reserve System issued its Policy on Payments
System Risk to provide guidance on principles and minimum standards
for managing risk in systemically important payments systems (Federal
Reserve Board 2007). While aimed primarily at wholesale, large-value
payment systems, it is also relevant to retail payments systems. The
Federal Reserve applies these standards to the retail payments systems
(ACH and checks) that it operates and where it has explicit supervisory
authority over financial institutions that operate clearing and settlement
systems. The Federal Reserve also participates in national and interna-
tional policy processes that set standards for operating and controlling
risk in payments systems. 
The authority of the Federal Reserve System to oversee payments,
however, is limited. Recently Chairman Ben Bernanke stated that “[i]n
contrast to the situation in some other countries, the Federal Reserve
lacks explicit legal authority to oversee systemically important payments
systems.”
32 Federal Reserve examiners can review payment activities of
the banks in their jurisdiction, and they also participate in the TSP
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supervision program. Federal Reserve authority to set regulations also
has important influence on some operational aspects of payments and
on incentives to control risk by determining liability in cases of fraud
and operational disruptions. 
But neither the Federal Reserve, nor any other federal agency, has
explicit authority to manage retail payments risk from a system perspec-
tive. Private industry efforts to manage risks across payment channels are
helpful in this regard, but implementation of their recommendations
may be hampered by inherent difficulties of coordinating many partici-
pants in the payments system. 
V.  STRENGTHENING RISK MANAGEMENT IN 
RETAIL PAYMENTS
In light of recent changes to the payments system, risk management
in the retail payments system might be strengthened in three ways:
improve the ability of the market to manage risk, strengthen supervision
of payment activities, and help coordinate risk management from a
system perspective (Table 5). This section reviews options for reforms
that address nonbank presence in the payments system. It then closes
with a discussion of proposals to better allow gathering and analysis of
data relevant to risk in retail payments. 
Improve the ability of the market to manage payment risk
One barrier to industry efforts to manage risk in payments is that
private incentives can inhibit implementation. Efficient risk manage-
ment requires that those in the best position to control risk should also
face financial consequences of failure, but this is not always the case in
the payments industry. Options to correct this may require some legal
reforms. Enhancing information useful to managing risks can also help
industry efforts. 
Some payments participants may not follow adequate security and
operational standards because they do not face the entire cost of break-
downs. A 2004 data breach at the retailer BJ’s Wholesale Club caused
several financial institutions to reissue thousands of debit cards at a cost
of $10 to $20 each. Lawsuits that sought to recover these costs were dis-
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missed because the financial institutions did not have a direct contrac-
tual relationship with BJ’s (Pereira). Similarly, when credit cards are used
online for fraudulent purchases, merchants pay for the fraud, not the
issuer of the card. Merchants argue that this reduces the incentive of
card issuers to implement anti-fraud measures and to track down fraud-
ulent activity for online purchases (Becket and Sapsford). Perhaps more
important, critical software and payments processing services are some-
times contracted so that the vendor does not face liability in case of
failure (Menta; Funnell). In other words, the vendor may not face the
full cost of errors for which it may be responsible. 
BJ’s incentive to implement appropriate risk mitigation systems is
incomplete because it was not held responsible for all costs associated
with failure of its system. Software makers may have insufficient incen-
tive to produce high-quality, low-risk services and software. Reforms to
legal responsibilities or to limits on litigation could help to align liability
and ability to control risk.
33 To protect the payments system, analysts
Table 5
OPTIONS FOR STRENGTHENING RISK MANAGEMENT
IN RETAIL PAYMENTS
Purpose Reform Benefit
Improve ability of the market  • Align legal responsibility with • Improve incentives to manage risk
to manage risk cost of operational breakdowns • Tie ability to control risk
• Redefine revocability of payments with responsibility
• Provide information on quality of  • Enable payment participants to
risk management judge quality of risk control
Strengthen supervision of •  Mandate control of payments risk • Focus supervisory activity
payment activities • Add enforcement options for  • Tailor sanctions to shortcomings
TSP  supervision • Actively supervise risky 
• Expand eligibility for supervision payment processors
• Redefine mission of the FTC • Clarify and enforce security among
retailers and other nonbank 
organizations
Coordinate risk • Create institutions to coordinate • Target specific public policy goals
management from risk management • Provide robust perspective on 
system perspective  • Mandate umbrella risk management  risk management
of retail payments
Collect and analyze • Require payments participants to • Better understanding of payments   
useful information   report risk-related information system risk
• Assign responsibility for collecting  • Guidance for private and 
and analyzing data public risk management
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have proposed legal reform and regulation to rationalize liability and
responsibility for risk in contracting relationships for payments process-
ing (Glaessner, Kellerman, and McNevin 2002, 2004).
Proper design of legal liability can also help in the fight to control
illicit activity such as fraud and money laundering. Payments service
providers—both bank and nonbank—are often in the best position to
screen and monitor customers so as to exclude those with illicit intent.
One option is to redefine revocability rules in payments to make it easier
to recover illicit funds. This would also make payments service providers
more responsible for the costs associated with clients engaged in illegal
transfer of funds and enhance incentives of payments service providers
to improve their gatekeeping responsibilities (Anderson). 
Providing information on data security and resiliency could also
help the market manage payments risk. For example, a SAS 70 audit is
an evaluation of the control structure of an organization over informa-
tion security risks, and the written report can provide information to a
TSP’s clients about potential exposure.
34 Licensing or certification of
payment providers can convey a level of competence and allow potential
clients to judge providers on the quality of the providers’ security con-
trols. Proposals to more widely release exam reports for major vendors in
the TSP supervision program have a similar purpose (Lemieux). Done
properly, this can convey information about a firm’s risk control envi-
ronment without compromising security and allow clients to seek out
vendors with high-quality internal controls. 
Strengthen supervision of payment activities of banks and technology
service providers
As noted earlier, the primary goal of the supervision of depository
institutions is to protect the institution’s depositors. An explicit goal of
controlling payments system risk could be added to the mandate of
supervisors. By doing so, supervisors would be encouraged to look
beyond narrow consequences of problems in the payments activities of
financial institutions or of TSPs. This would require modification of the
policies and procedures used in supervision of financial institutions and
TSPs to attain objectives tied to protecting the payments system. 
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Supervisors of TSPs could be given additional enforcement options.
Enforcement should provide options that range from mild to severe to
allow tailoring sanctions to the severity of shortcomings. In addition,
assuming some details of enforcement actions are disclosed, payment
participants would gain more information on potential consequences of
weaknesses in risk management. 
Policymakers could also consider expanding eligibility requirements
for supervision of nonbank payment participants. Expanding supervi-
sion to other payment processors would be consistent with the current
expertise and practices of financial institution supervisory agencies. It is
instructive that even smaller payments processors can accumulate large
databases of payment card information, as was the case at CardSystems
Solutions, and so there may be some value in adding smaller payments
processors. Similarly, there may be value in extending eligibility to sig-
nificant payments processors who are not in an outsourcing relationship
with a bank. 
Table 2 suggests that it may be particularly important to strengthen
data security in the retail sector of the economy. Because it has jurisdiction
over commercial firms in data security matters, policymakers could con-
sider strengthening the mandate and enforcement powers of the FTC. 
Coordinate risk mitigation across elements of the payments system
Industry efforts to coordinate risk mitigation, both within and
across payment channels, represent significant progress. Policy changes
just discussed would assist those efforts. But incomplete incentives to
control risk and interdependence among payments participants suggests
that some public policy steps aimed at improving coordination of risk
mitigation in the payments system would be valuable. 
At least nine federal agencies can influence risk management in pay-
ments (Table 3).
35 In addition, state authorities, private industry, and
international agencies each have some role. At the present time, many of
these authorities have a great degree of independence in their mission.
There are some informal and formal coordination among these authori-
ties. A good example is the process undertaken in the aftermath of
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September 11 in a federal interagency effort to improve the resiliency of
systemically important payments systems in the United States.
36  None
of these initiatives, however, considers the payments system as a whole. 
One potential model could be the European Commission’s Fraud
Prevention Expert Group (FPEG).
37 This group consists of different
parties involved in fraud prevention, including various payment net-
works, banks, public authorities, law enforcement, consumer groups,
and others. The FPEG provides a forum where participants can
exchange information and best practices to prevent fraud. Such partici-
pation can help facilitate cooperation among participants. The group
also provides advice to the European Commission. While the FPEG
provides a forum on fraud prevention, the model could be applied to all
aspects of risk management in payments. 
An alternative is what might be called an umbrella model for man-
agement of risk in the payments system. This model stresses the systemic
nature of payments and provides a more robust perspective of risk than
when each element of that payments network is analyzed separately
(McPhail). This model does not necessarily involve regulation. Rather, it
could use a range of actions (such as legal reforms) that might enhance
private efforts at managing risks, establish institutions to coordinate risk
management across payment platforms, act as a liaison for public and
private interests in risk management. Regulation might be called for
when there is a clear public interest, regulation is cost effective, and other
ways of addressing risk management shortcomings are ineffective. 
Who would take on this responsibility? A central bank may be in a
position to successfully implement this responsibility because of its
unique position in the payments system (McPhail). However, central
bank linkage to the payments system is primarily with other financial
institutions, and the risk in retail payments clearly extends beyond
financial institutions. Effective management of risk in the U.S. retail
payments system may need to involve interaction among all federal and
state agencies that influence payments risk management. 
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Collect and analyze information useful to understand payments system risk
More and better data would help provide the information to guide
decisions.  Policymakers should consider proposals that allow gathering and
analysis of data relevant to risk in retail payments. In recognition of the value
of these data, some central banks have significant powers to gather informa-
tion on payments useful for monitoring and surveillance purposes.
38 
The analysis of data breaches shown above is based on flawed data
but illustrates the value that empirical information can have in under-
standing payments system risk. It allows a breakdown of the sources of
data breaches by bank and nonbank organizations. It allows a distinc-
tion between an incident and the number of compromised records, the
latter of which is a better measure of risk exposure. Comprehensive and
uniform data breach notification requirements would make this type of
analysis more helpful to policymakers.
39 
More facts relevant to a number of questions would be useful to
determine whether and where more public action is warranted. What is
the nature of operational risk in payments processing? How many inci-
dents are there and how costly have they been? How often have
payments disruptions occurred at vendors that are outside of the TSP
supervision program and how significant are they? How effective are
private institutional arrangements that facilitate the sharing of informa-
tion on security and operational disruptions to payments systems? 
VI.  CONCLUSION
A 1997 report on risks in payments, settlement, and clearing by the
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) identified credit risk, fraud,
and malicious activity as the main risks in retail payments. Given the
prevalence of checks in payments and the early stage of the Internet at
the time of the report, the GAO conclusion was reasonable. But today,
with the great reliance of payments on electronic networks and on
nonbank payment providers, the risk profile of retail payments is signif-
icantly different. Unauthorized access, virus infections, malicious
attacks, and operational breakdowns have become part of the payments
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landscape. Some of the disruptions to payments caused by these prob-
lems are severe enough to qualify as systemwide risks and seem to be
coming with greater frequency. 
Nonbanks bring new technology and perspectives that can signifi-
cantly contribute to reducing risk in the payments system. Nonbanks are
developing innovations related to security (such as biometrics), payment
processing improvements, and real-time controls over payment authenti-
cation. These contributions improve security, reduce fraud, and improve
the resiliency of the payments system. But the emergence of nonbanks as
elements in the payments system, at a minimum, alters the mix of risks
in the payments system and potentially magnifies some old or introduces
new ones. Nonbanks complicate control of outsourcing risk and can
introduce weaknesses to the payments system by adding locations for
access or by complicating coordination of mitigation efforts. 
Policymakers have a number of options that could help to reduce
risk in the retail payments system. The ability of the market to self-reg-
ulate could be enhanced by better aligning responsibility and control in
matters of data security and operational integrity and by improving
information relevant to risk mitigation. Public involvement in manag-
ing retail payment risk could be strengthened by providing an explicit
mandate to protect payments, authorizing regulation where weaknesses
in data security or operational integrity are apparent, and by giving
supervisors appropriate enforcement tools. In recognition of the
network structure of payments, efforts that assist coordination of over-
sight and risk management would be valuable. Policy choices would be
clearer if more useful data were collected and analyzed. 
Lastly, primary authority for supervision of nonbank payment
providers in the United States comes from the Bank Service Company
Act. This act was passed more than 40 years ago and reflects technology
in service at that time. Since then, there have been vast increases in the
sophistication of technology applied in payments and significant
changes in payment options. A review of the authority for public
involvement in managing risk in payments would therefore be useful.
This type of review would be particularly valuable in areas where risk
exposure of payment participants arises from their interrelationships in a
payments network. 
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ENDNOTES
1Crowell Moring LLP website at www.crowell.com/pdf/SecurityBreachTable.pdf,
accessed 4-13-07. Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia now have noti-
fication laws. California enacted its disclosure law in 2003, while the effective date
for other states was mid-2005 or later. 
2Chart 2 has a break at 2002/2003 because the transaction volume was meas-
ured differently beginning in 2003. Prior to that, many ATM transactions were
counted by more than one ATM network. As a result, measures of aggregate mar-
ket share could be above 100 percent. Much of the double counting was elimi-
nated after 2003. 
3A consolidator site can present billing information for many billers on a sin-
gle Web page and typically offers an option to pay the bill (Wolfe 2004, p. 17.) 
4CheckFree has estimated that it has a 75 to 80 percent share of this market
(“Paper Costs Cut through e-Payment Option,” p. 14). 
5From eBay’s fourth quarter 2006 earnings report press release dated January
24, 2007 , http://investor.ebay.com. 
6“Card Issuers Beware: PayPal to Offer Credit,” “PayPal Targets Music
Download Micropayments;” and “PayPal, The Fifth Credit Card?” 
7The Committee on Payments and Settlement Systems (2000) identifies five
major categories of risk associated with payments transactions: fraud, operational,
legal, settlement, and systemic risks. Rather than discuss these general principles,
this article focuses on risks of particular relevance to paper and electronic pay-
ments systems. For example, Bradford, Davies, and Weiner argue that nonbanks
pose limited settlement risk (though they warn of indirect nonbank access to set-
tlement facilities through “captive bank” relationships). See pp. 9-11 for a more
complete discussion of payments system risk. 
8Since this incident, PayPal has developed state-of-the-art data security and
fraud detection systems to the point where loss rates due to fraud for merchants
who use PayPal are noticeably below the e-Commerce average (Cox; Garver). See
“Computer Scientists” for a description of some recent techniques used by crimi-
nals to perpetrate fraud through online auction sites. 
9The two nonbank networks are Star and Pulse. The third is Visa’s Interlink,
which will become a nonbank network when Visa completes plans to become a
publicly held organization (Berry and Breitkopf). 
10For example, since 1997, bank losses have been fairly steady despite a five-
fold increase in attempts to commit check fraud (Bills). 
11Phishers target PayPal and eBay in 77 percent of their recent e-mail (Sancho
and Yaneza, p. 13). 
12When made aware that funds were not going to arrive on time, one credit
union extended $1.8 million in credit to cover expected deposits for its members.
13When asked about challenges they face in hiring new employees, community
banks rank skills of potential employees as a significant challenge (Myers, p. 18). 
14Given the flaws in this data, this is a tentative conclusion that should be
explored further as better data and more experience with existing risk manage-
ment processes become available. 
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15Threats such as worms, trojan horses, bots, spyware, and phishing increased
163 percent between December 2005 and December 2006 (Sancho and Yaneza).
Creators of these threats are increasingly motivated by financial gain and are par-
ticipating in underground markets to trade stolen data and malicious code. 
16Another important area of oversight is systemically important payments sys-
tems, which is governed in the U.S. by the Federal Reserve System’s Policy on Pay-
ments System Risk. Because this article is focused on retail payments, it will not go
into any depth for systemically important payments systems, which are clearing
and settlement systems for large value (wholesale) payments. 
17For the purposes of this article, the term “nonbank” refers to any payment
provider with no bank affiliation. Whether a particular payments processor is
supervised is not publicly available information. 
18Examples include the retailer DSW, the credit agency ChoicePoint, and
software vendor Guidance Software. 
19A 1996 amendment allowed bank service companies to incorporate, so the
act is sometimes referred to as the Bank Service Corporation Act. 
20Members of the FFIEC represent all of the federal agencies responsible for
regulating and supervising of U.S. depository institutions, including the OCC, the
Federal Reserve System, the FDIC, the Office of Thrift Supervision and the
National Credit Union Administration. It promotes uniformity across agencies in
the federal examination of depository institutions by prescribing uniform examina-
tion principles, developing common reporting systems, and conducting schools for
examiners.
21Business activities shown in Table 4 are based on information provided by
examiners. Examiners do not expect that these reports would be subject to statis-
tical analysis and therefore the completeness of the reported lines of business is
uncertain. However, it seems unlikely that any misreporting would be biased
regarding payments activity and so the relative position of bank versus nonbank
payments providers should not be misleading.
22Whether a TSP is counted as providing payment services is based on it offer-
ing at least one of 11 payment-related lines of business: ACH processing/services,
ATM processing/services/network/switch, bill payment service, credit card issuance,
credit and/or debit card merchant processing, credit card network/switch, check
processing, check processing software vendor clearing and settlement, POS process-
ing/services/network/switch, and wholesale payments. 
23There is no comprehensive data source that would show the number of
companies that provide payment services to financial institutions. 
24If they do provide outsourced services to banks, these organizations may be
eligible for the TSP supervision program. 
25In a speech delivered in April 1998, Roger Ferguson, former vice chair of
the Board of Governors, stated that “I do not believe that the market for new
retail electronic payment services reflects the existence of market failures.... The
government should avoid regulatory actions that may inhibit the evolution of
emerging payments products and services or prevent the effective operation of
competitive market forces. It is not clear whether, or what type of, regulation will
be needed for many new products and it is important to avoid jumping to the
conclusion that such regulations are inevitable over the longer term(Ferguson).”   
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26Economists refer to these complications as asymmetric information and
moral hazard (Braun and others). 
27NACHA consists of financial institutions, industry councils, and other
stakeholders in the ACH system. It sets rules and standards for ACH transactions
and has some monitoring and enforcement responsibilities.
28For more information, see the FS-ISAC website at www.fsisac.com. 
29Similarly, in 2006, First Data and five large banks formed a joint venture
called Early Warning Services LLC as a vehicle for payments providers to share
information and expertise on fraud prevention and screening of customers (Bre-
itkopf 2006b). 
30The Partner Group is sponsored by BITS, a financial industry consortium
that is a vehicle for industry collaboration on emerging issues. For more informa-
tion, see the BITS website at www.bitsinfo.org/index.html. 
31For example, after nearly two years of implementation, some observers feel
that the adoption of the PCI data security standards has been slow (Sidel). Visa
has recently increased sanctions for noncompliance and has implemented a
reward program to encourage implementation (Aplin). 
32In addition, Chairman Bernanke stated that “Federal Reserve powers in this
area derive to a considerable extent from its bank supervisory authority. Notably,
some key institutions providing clearing and settlement services hold bank char-
ters that place them under Federal Reserve oversight.... The Fed is also either the
direct or umbrella supervisor of several large commercial banks that are critical to
the payments system through their clearing and settlement activities” (Bernanke).
By contrast, the Banque de France has broad power to oversee noncash payments
(European Central Bank Oversight Division, p. 21). 
33In the aftermath of the TJX data breach, the state of Massachusetts is con-
sidering legislation that would make commercial firms responsible for data
breaches liable for the associated costs of reissuing payment cards (Pereira). 
34A description of SAS 70 audits, www.sas70.com. 
35Some of these actions are indirect because there is a trade-off between risk and
efficiency in payments (European Central Bank Oversight Division, p. 45). 
36Guidelines for this effort were presented in Board of Governors and others
2002. A 2006 report to congress discusses private sector implementation of the
guidelines (Board of Governors and others). 
37See their website at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/fpeg/index_en.htm. 
38For example, see Monetary Authority of Singapore. 
39The recently implemented data breach notification requirement in the Federal
Reserve’s Operating Circular 1 is a step in the right direction. Information on the new
requirements, www.frbservices.org/OperatingCirculars/index.html.
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